000			02072cam a22003012 b4500
001			7697037
005			20131008125957.0
006			m d
007			Paper bound
008			950506e19960104ncua es|||||||| 2|eng|d
020			_a9780195101164
035			_a(WaSeSS)ssj0000088705
037			_b00020142
040			_aBIP US _dWaSeSS
082	0	0	_a171.3 _222 _bHU-P
100	1		_aHurka, Thomas
245	1	0	_aPerfectionism
260			_aNew York : _bOxford University Press _c1996
300			_axi,222p.
440		0	_aOxford Ethics Series
506			_aLicense restrictions may limit access.
520	8		_aAnnotation _bPerfectionism is one of the great moralities of the Western tradition. It holds that certain states of humans, such as knowledge, achievement, and friendship, are good apart from any pleasure they may bring, and that the morally right act is always the one that most promotes these states.Defined more narrowly, perfectionism identifies the human good by reference to human nature: if knowledge and achievement are good, it is because they realize aspects of human nature. This book gives an account of perfectionism, first in the narrower sense, analyzing its central concepts anddefending a theory of human nature in which rationality plays a central role. It then uses this theory to construct an elaborate account of the intrinsic value of beliefs and actions that embody rationality, and applies this account to political questions about liberty and equality. The bookattempts to formulate the most defensible version of perfectionism, using contemporary analytic techniques. It aims both to regain for perfectionism a central place in contemporary moral debate and to shed light on the writings of classical perfectionists such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Hegel, Marx,Nietzsche, and T.H. Green.
521			_aCollege Audience _bOxford University Press, Incorporated
773		0	_tOxford Scholarship Online Philosophy
910			_aBowker Global Books in Print record
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c26981 _d26981