000			04267cam a22003738i 4500
001			20622265
003			JGU
005			20190803020035.0
007			Hardbound
008			180809s2018 enk 000 0 eng
010			_a 2018038297
020			_a9781849466868
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC
042			_apcc
050	0	0	_aK260 _b.T56 2018
082	0	0	_a340.114 _223 _bKO-L
100	1		_aKopcke Tinture, Maris _959827
245	1	0	_aLegal validity _bthe fabric of justice
260			_aOxford _bHart Publishing _c2019
263			_a1901
300			_axi, 184p.
490	0		_aEuropean academy of legal theory series
520			_a"Legal reasoning settles morally pressing matters through a technique that largely bypasses open-ended moral argument. That technique makes central what certain persons validly decided in the past, for example in creating statutes, judicial resolutions, contracts, or wills. Identifying valid decisions is a lawyerly skill and, echoing legal practice, legal philosophy has paid considerable attention to validity criteria. But it has neglected to explore validity's point: whether, and if so exactly how, the special technique of validity contributes to a legal system's ability to realise justice and human rights. Even the most sensible defences of the moral need for positive law have insufficiently probed this key step in the argument. This book lays bare the workings of legal validity, and shows why, and within what general limits, this technique equips legal systems with privileged tools to foster human well-being. In so doing, the book explains how power-conferring norms setting out validity criteria endow agents' intentions with 'performative' effect ('I hereby.') and can secure the requirement of justice that there be widespread convergence on specific patterns of conduct shaped through a cooperative effort. Legal meaning is accordingly systemic, resulting from the valid acts of multiple agents whose decisions can, by virtue of exercising legal power, also exercise moral power (authority). In short, the book articulates why it is morally necessary that validity does not primarily turn on moral considerations"--
520			_a"Legal reasoning settles morally pressing matters through a technique that largely bypasses open-ended moral argument. That technique makes central what certain persons validly decided in the past, for example in creating statutes, judicial resolutions, contracts, or wills. Identifying valid decisions is a lawyerly skill and, echoing legal practice, legal philosophy has paid considerable attention to validity criteria. But it has neglected to explore validity's point: whether, and if so exactly how, the special technique of validity contributes to a legal system's ability to realise justice and human rights. Even the most sensible defences of the moral need for positive law have insufficiently probed this key step in the argument. This book lays bare the workings of legal validity, and shows why, and within what general limits, this technique equips legal systems with privileged tools to foster human well-being. In so doing, the book explains how power-conferring norms setting out validity criteria endow agents' intentions with 'performative' effect ('I hereby...') and can secure the requirement of justice that there be widespread convergence on specific patterns of conduct shaped through a cooperative effort. Legal meaning is accordingly systemic, resulting from the valid acts of multiple agents whose decisions can, by virtue of exercising legal power, also exercise moral power (authority). In short, the book articulates why it is morally necessary that validity does not primarily turn on moral considerations"--
650		0	_aEffectiveness and validity of law _9365
650		0	_aLaw _xMethodology _959828
650		0	_aRule of law _959829
650		0	_aJurisprudence _959830
650		0	_aLaw _xPhilosophy _959831
776	0	8	_iOnline version: _aKöpcke Tinturé, Maris, 1978- author. _tLegal validity _dOXford [UK] ; Portland, Oregon : Hart Publishing, 2018 _z9781509904297 _w(DLC) 2018038553
906			_a7 _bcbc _corignew _d1 _eecip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cBK _01
999			_c229766 _d229766