000 02431nam a22003011a 4500
001 bpp09258412
003 UtOrBLW
005 20220728105214.0
006 m d
007 cr un ---uuuua
008 150326s2015 enk ob 001 0 eng d
020 _a9781474201186
040 _aUtOrBLW
_beng
_cUtOrBLW
050 4 _aK230
_b.K97 2015
082 _a342.4411
_223
_bKY-S
100 1 _aKyritsis, Dimitrios
_928885
245 1 0 _aShared authority
_bcourts and legislatures in legal theory
260 _aLondon
_bBloomsbury
_c2015
300 _a1 online resource (viii, 172 p.)
490 1 _aLaw and practical reason
_vv. 7
520 _a"This important new book advances a fresh philosophical account of the relationship between the legislature and courts, opposing the common conception of law, in which it is legislatures that primarily create the law, and courts that primarily apply it. This conception has eclectic affinities with legal positivism, and although it may have been a helpful intellectual tool in the past, it now increasingly generates more problems than it solves. For this reason, the author argues, legal philosophers are better off abandoning it. At the same time they are asked to dismantle the philosophical and doctrinal infrastructure that has been based on it and which has been hitherto largely unquestioned. In its place the book offers an alternative framework for understanding the role of courts and the legislature; a framework which is distinctly anti-positivist and which builds on Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law. But, contrary to Dworkin, it insists that legal duty is sensitive to the position one occupies in the project of governing; legal interpretation is not the solitary task of one super-judge, but a collaborative task structured by principles of institutional morality such as separation of powers. Moreover in this collaborative task, different participants have a moral duty to respect each other's contributions."--Bloomsbury Publishing.
530 _aAlso issued in print.
533 _aElectronic reproduction.
_bLondon :
_cBloomsbury Publishing,
_d2014.
_nAvailable via World Wide Web.
_nAccess limited by licensing agreement.
_7s2014 dcunns
650 0 _aLaw (Philosophical concept)
_953874
830 0 _aLaw and practical reason
_vv. 7
_967894
856 4 0 _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474201186
_3Bloomsbury collection
942 _2ddc
_cEBK
999 _c227581
_d227581