Moral hazard : does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders? / Timothy Lane, Steven Phillips.
Material type: TextSeries: Economic issues (International Monetary Fund) ; 28.Publisher: [Washington, D.C.] : International Monetary Fund, 2002Copyright date: ©2002Description: 1 online resource (v, 15 pages) : illustrationsContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9781451935219
- 1451935218
- 1462318975
- 9781462318971
- 1452700923
- 9781452700922
- 1455294314
- 9781455294312
- 145270192X
- 9781452701929
- Does IMF financing encourage imprudence by borrowers and lenders?
- International Monetary Fund -- Evaluation
- International Monetary Fund
- Economic assistance -- Developing countries
- Debts, External -- Developing countries
- Loans, Foreign -- Developing countries
- Country risk -- Developing countries
- Moral hazard -- Developing countries
- Economic assistance, Domestic
- Country risk
- Aide au développement économique régional
- Dettes extérieures -- Pays en voie de développement
- Prêts étrangers -- Pays en voie de développement
- Risque pays
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Development -- Business Development
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Development -- Economic Development
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Development -- General
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Government & Business
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Structural Adjustment
- POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Public Policy -- Economic Policy
- Evaluation
- Country risk
- Debts, External
- Economic assistance
- Loans, Foreign
- Moral hazard
- Developing countries
- Buitenlandse schulden
- Ethiek
- Kredietverlening
- IMF
- Business & Economics
- Economic History
- Investment risk -- Developing countries
- 338.91 22
- HC60 .L311 2002eb
- 83.44
- digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
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Electronic-Books | OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
"This Economic Issue is based on IMF Working Paper WP/00/168, 'Does IMF financing result in moral hazard?', October 2000"--Page iii.
Print version record.
"The argument that IMF financing creates moral hazard cannot be lightly dismissed. From the outset, this pamphlet recognizes that, to the extent IMF-supported programs try to contain the total economic costs of financial crises, some element of moral hazard - a greater willingness of creditors and debtors to take risks of such crises - is, in principle, an unavoidable consequence. But the key question, rather than a matter of presence or absence, is the degree of moral hazard. The most basic evidence, even in the case of countries that are supposed to be too big to fail, refutes the most extreme hypothesis - that investors believe they have a full guarantee from the IMF in the event of a financial crisis."--Preface.
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Electronic reproduction. [S.l.] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2010. MiAaHDL
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. MiAaHDL
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Available also in Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish.
digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL
Includes bibliographical references.
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