Designing economic mechanisms / Leonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter.

By:

Hurwicz, Leonid

Contributor(s):

Reiter, Stanley

Material type: Text

TextPublication details: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006.Description: 1 online resource (ix, 344 pages) : illustrationsContent type:

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

0511219008
9780511219009
0521836417
9780521836418
9780511220999
0511220995
9780511754258
0511754256
1280480297
9781280480294
0511220480
9780511220487
1107161452
9781107161450
0511308965
9780511308963
0511219687
9780511219689
9780521724104
0521724104

Subject(s): Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Print version:: Designing economic mechanisms.DDC classification:

330.01/5195 22

LOC classification:

HB135 .H87 2006eb

Other classification:

83.03

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

Mechanisms and mechanism design -- From goals to means : constructing mechanisms -- Designing informationally efficient mechanisms using the language of sets -- Revelation mechanisms.

Summary: A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.

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Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Materials specified	Status	Date due	Barcode
Electronic-Books	OPJGU Sonepat- Campus	E-Books EBSCO			Available

Includes bibliographical references (pages 335-340) and index.

Mechanisms and mechanism design -- From goals to means : constructing mechanisms -- Designing informationally efficient mechanisms using the language of sets -- Revelation mechanisms.

Print version record.

A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.

English.

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