TY  - BOOK
AU  - Takeuchi,Hiroki
TI  - Tax reform in rural China: revenue, resistance, and authoritarian rule 
SN  - 9781316004616
AV  - HJ1401 .T35 2014eb
U1  - 336.2/01451 23
PY  - 2014///
CY  - New York, NY
PB  - Cambridge University Press
KW  - Fiscal policy
KW  - China
KW  - Taxation
KW  - Rural population
KW  - Rural development
KW  - Politique fiscale
KW  - Chine
KW  - Impôt
KW  - Population rurale
KW  - Développement rural
KW  - POLITICAL SCIENCE
KW  - Government
KW  - International
KW  - bisacsh
KW  - BUSINESS & ECONOMICS
KW  - Public Finance
KW  - fast
KW  - Electronic books
N1  - Includes bibliographical references and index; Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Tables; Figures; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Introduction; 1 The Theory of Revenue and Resistance under Authoritarian Rule in Rural China; Part I Historical and Analytical Contexts; 2 Revenue and Resistance in Rural China in History; 3 Revenue and Resistance under Authoritarian Rule in Post-Mao Rural China, 1980-2005; 4 Survival Strategies of Local Governments; Part II Analytic Narratives; 5 Exit Strategies of Villagers; Appendix 5A: Formal Description and Solution to the Game of Migration and Taxation; 6 Voice Strategies of VillagersAppendix 6A: Formal Description and Solution to the Migration, Participation, Taxation Game; 7 Village Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Rural China; Appendix 7A: Formal Description and Solution to the Village Election Game; Conclusion; Appendix Empirical Sources and Methods; Appendix A: Informants; Appendix B: Interview Questions; Appendix C: Sources of the Cases on Village Elections; References; Index
N2  - "How does China maintain authoritarian rule while it is committed to market-oriented economic reforms? This book analyzes this puzzle by offering a systematic analysis of the central-local governmental relationship in rural China, focusing on rural taxation and political participation. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Chinese local officials and villagers, and combining them with game-theoretic analyses, it argues that the central government uses local governments as a target of blame for the problems that the central government has actually created. The most recent rural tax reforms, which began in 2000, were a conscious trade-off between fiscal crises and rural instability. For the central government, local fiscal crises and the lack of public goods in agricultural areas were less serious concerns than the heavy financial burdens imposed on farmers and the rural unrest that the predatory extractive behavior of local governments had generated in the 1990s, which threatened both economic reforms and authoritarian rule"--
UR  - https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=786083
ER  -