Why are there so many banking crises? : the politics and policy of bank regulation / Jean-Charles Rochet.
Material type: TextPublication details: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, ©2008.Description: 1 online resource (x, 308 pages) : illustrationsContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 9781400828319
- 1400828317
- Bank failures -- Government policy
- Banks and banking -- State supervision
- Lenders of last resort
- Banks and banking -- Political aspects
- Banques -- Faillites -- Politique gouvernementale
- Banques -- Contrôle de l'État
- Banques -- Aspect politique
- Prêteurs en dernier ressort
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Banks & Banking
- POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Public Policy -- Economic Policy
- Bank failures -- Government policy
- Banks and banking -- State supervision
- Lenders of last resort
- 332.1 22
- HG1725 .R63 2008eb
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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Electronic-Books | OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Includes bibliographical references.
Why are there so many banking crises? / Jean-Charles Rochet -- Coordination failures and the lender of last resort : was Bagehot right after all? / Jean-Charles Rochet, Xavier Vives -- The lender of last resort : a twenty-first century approach / Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi, Jean-Charles Rochet -- Macroeconomic shocks and banking supervision / Jean-Charles Rochet -- Interbank lending and systemic risk / Jean-Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole -- Controlling risk in payment systems / Jean-Charles Rochet, Jean Tirole -- Systemic risk, interbank relations, and the central bank / Xavier Freixas, Bruno M. Parigi, Jean-Charles Rochet -- Capital requirements and the behavior of commercial banks / Jean-Charles Rochet -- Rebalancing the three pillars of Basel II / Jean-Charles Rochet -- The three pillars of Basel II : optimizing the mix / Jean-Paul Décamps, Jean-Charles Rochet, Benoît Roger.
Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world's leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?, he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated.
Print version record.
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