Designing economic mechanisms / Leonid Hurwicz, Stanley Reiter.
Material type: TextPublication details: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006.Description: 1 online resource (ix, 344 pages) : illustrationsContent type:- text
- computer
- online resource
- 0511219008
- 9780511219009
- 0521836417
- 9780521836418
- 9780511220999
- 0511220995
- 9780511754258
- 0511754256
- 1280480297
- 9781280480294
- 0511220480
- 9780511220487
- 1107161452
- 9781107161450
- 0511308965
- 9780511308963
- 0511219687
- 9780511219689
- 9780521724104
- 0521724104
- Economics, Mathematical
- Economics -- Mathematical models
- Mathematical optimization
- Game theory
- Game Theory
- Mathématiques économiques
- Économie politique -- Modèles mathématiques
- Optimisation mathématique
- Théorie des jeux
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Econometrics
- BUSINESS & ECONOMICS -- Statistics
- Economics, Mathematical
- Economics -- Mathematical models
- Game theory
- Mathematical optimization
- 330.01/5195 22
- HB135 .H87 2006eb
- 83.03
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Materials specified | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Electronic-Books | OPJGU Sonepat- Campus | E-Books EBSCO | Available |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 335-340) and index.
Mechanisms and mechanism design -- From goals to means : constructing mechanisms -- Designing informationally efficient mechanisms using the language of sets -- Revelation mechanisms.
Print version record.
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
English.
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