It takes more than a network : the Iraqi insurgency and organizational adaptation / Chad C. Serena.

By:

Serena, Chad C [author.]

Material type: Text

text

Media type:

computer

Carrier type:

online resource

ISBN:

9780804790468
0804790469

Subject(s): Genre/Form:

Additional physical formats: Print version:: It takes more than a network.DDC classification:

956.7044/3 23

LOC classification:

DS79.76 .S474 2014eb

Online resources:

Click here to access online

Contents:

The nature of the Iraqi insurgency, networks, and organizational adaptation -- The Iraqi insurgency : organizational inputs -- The Iraqi insurgency : organizational outputs, learning, and summary of the adaptive cycle -- Seeing Afghanistan, thinking Iraq : evaluating and comparing the insurgency in Afghanistan -- It takes more than a network.

Summary: It Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adaptation. In particular, it answers the question of why the Iraqi insurgency was seemingly so successful between 2003 and late 2006 and yet nearly totally collapsed by 2008. The book's main argument is that the Iraqi insurgency failed to achieve longer-term organizational goals because many of its organizational strengths were also its organizational weaknesses: these characteristics abetted and then corrupted the Iraqi insurgency's ability to adap.

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Holdings
Item type	Home library	Collection	Call number	Materials specified	Status	Date due	Barcode
Electronic-Books	OPJGU Sonepat- Campus	E-Books EBSCO			Available

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Print version record.

It Takes More than a Network presents a structured investigation of the Iraqi insurgency's capacity for and conduct of organizational adaptation. In particular, it answers the question of why the Iraqi insurgency was seemingly so successful between 2003 and late 2006 and yet nearly totally collapsed by 2008. The book's main argument is that the Iraqi insurgency failed to achieve longer-term organizational goals because many of its organizational strengths were also its organizational weaknesses: these characteristics abetted and then corrupted the Iraqi insurgency's ability to adap.

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