Politics of authoritarian rule
Material type: TextSeries: Cambridge studies in comparative politicsPublication details: New York Cambridge University Press 2012Description: xviii,228pISBN:- 9781107607453
- 320.53 23 SV-P
- POL000000
Item type | Home library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | |
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OPJGU Sonepat- Campus Main Library | General Books | 320.53 SV-P (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Available | 123564 |
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320.53 HA- Hannah Arendt and the uses of history imperialism, nation, race and genocide | 320.53 NI-E Equality and liberty a defense of radical egalitarianism | 320.53 SI-S State and politics Deleuze and Guattari on Marx | 320.53 SV-P Politics of authoritarian rule | 320.53089924 ME-J Jews and the left the rise and fall of a political alliance | 320.53092 CA-H Hannah Arendt a reinterpretation of her political thought | 320.53092 FE- Feminist interpretations of Hannah Arendt |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 203-221) and index.
Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: the anatomy of dictatorship; 2. The world of authoritarian politics; Part I. The Problem of Authoritarian Power-Sharing: 3. And then there was one!: Authoritarian power-sharing and the path to personal dictatorship; 4. Institutions, collective action, and the success of authoritarian power-sharing; Part II. The Problem of Authoritarian Control: 5. Moral hazard in authoritarian repression and the origins of military dictatorships; 6. Why authoritarian parties?: The regime party as an instrument of co-optation and control; 7. Conclusion: incentives and institutions in authoritarian politics.
"What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts. Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - the problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with whom dictators rule - the problem of authoritarian power-sharing. Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships from 1946 to 2008"--
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