Perpetuating the pork barrel policy subsystems and American democracy

Includes bibliographical references (p. 219-226) and index.

1. Policy subsystems and the pork barrel -- 2. The programmatic expansion of U.S. domestic spending -- 3. The geographic scope of domestic spending: A test of the universalism thesis -- 4. A portfolio theory of policy subsystems -- 5. Policy subsystem adaptability and resilience in the Reagan period -- 6. PAC contributions and the distribution of domestic assistance programs -- 7. Congressional elections and the pork barrel -- 8. Policy subsystems in practice and democratic theory -- App. 1 Descriptive data base of domestic assistance programs -- App. 2 Geographical data base of domestic assistance awards -- App. 3 Programs by agency and policy type -- App. 4 Departments and their distributive policy agencies -- App. 5 Federal agencies in four cabinet departments: Budgetary changes proposed by the Reagan administration for FY1983 -- App. 6 Financial assistance programs by public law bundle --

App. 7 PACs whose parent interest groups testified in hearings, grouped by public law and PAC coalition -- App. 8 Roll call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives on nine public laws -- App. 9 Probit results for House roll call votes on nine public laws -- App. 10 Concepts and measures.

This book details the policy subsystems - links among members of Congress, interest groups, program beneficiaries, and federal and subnational government agencies - that blanket the American political landscape. Robert Stein and Kenneth Bickers have constructed a new data-base detailing federal outlays to congressional districts for each federal program, and use it to examine four myths about the impact of policy subsystems on American government and democratic practice.

These include the myth that policy subsystems are a major contributor to the federal deficit; that, once created, federal programs grow inexorably and rarely die; that, to garner support for their programs, subsystem actors seek to universalize the geographic scope of program benefits; and that the flow of program benefits to constituencies in congressional districts ensures the reelection of legislators.

The authors conclude with an appraisal of proposals for reforming the American political system, including a balanced budget amendment, a presidential line-item veto, term limitations, campaign finance reform, and the reorganization of congressional committees.