Law and finance of related party transactions edited by Luca Enriques, Univeristy of Oxford; Tobias H. Troger, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University Department of Law.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

The law and (some) finance of related party transactions : an introduction / Luca Enriques and Tobias Troger -- Corporate control and the regulation of controlling shareholders / Zohar Goshen and Assaf Hamdani -- Optimally restrained tunneling : the puzzle of controlling shareholders' "generous" exploitation in bad-law jurisdictions / Sang Yop Kang -- Powering preemptive rights with presubscription disclosure / Jesse Fried -- MOM approval in a world of active shareholders / Edward Rock -- Institutional investors as minority shareholders / Assaf Hamdani and Yishay Yafeh -- Procedural and substantive review of related party transactions (RPTS) : the case for non-controlling shareholder-dependent (ncs-dependent) directors / Alessio M. Pacces -- Related party transactions and intragroup transactions / Jens Dammann -- Related-party transactions in state-owned enterprises : tunneling, propping, and policy channeling / Curtis Milhaupt and Mariana Pargendler -- Related party transactions in insolvency / Kristin Van Zwieten -- Related party transactions in East Asia / Kon Sik Kim -- Related party transactions in Commonwealth Asia : complexity revealed / Dan W. Puchniak and Umakanth Varottil -- Related party transactions : UK model / Paul Davies -- Related party transactions in france : a critical assessment / Genevieve Helleringer -- Germany's reluctance to regulate related party transactions / Tobias Troger -- Be careful what you wish for : how progress engendered regression in related party transaction regulation in Israel / Amir Licht -- Enforcing rules on related party transactions in Italy : one securities regulator's challenge / Marcello Bianchi, Luca Enriques and Mateja Milic.

"The separation of ownership and control is a natural feature of corporations: shareholders routinely delegate decision-making power within the firm among themselves or to one or more managers. Delegation can be explicit, via a consensual decision on who is going to run the company, or implicit, such as when investors buy shares in companies where another investor holds a majority stake and there is no side agreement allowing the former to share control"--