Tax reform in rural China : revenue, resistance, and authoritarian rule /
Takeuchi, Hiroki.
Tax reform in rural China : revenue, resistance, and authoritarian rule / Hiroki Takeuchi. - 1 online resource
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Tables; Figures; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Introduction; 1 The Theory of Revenue and Resistance under Authoritarian Rule in Rural China; Part I Historical and Analytical Contexts; 2 Revenue and Resistance in Rural China in History; 3 Revenue and Resistance under Authoritarian Rule in Post-Mao Rural China, 1980-2005; 4 Survival Strategies of Local Governments; Part II Analytic Narratives; 5 Exit Strategies of Villagers; Appendix 5A: Formal Description and Solution to the Game of Migration and Taxation. 6 Voice Strategies of VillagersAppendix 6A: Formal Description and Solution to the Migration, Participation, Taxation Game; 7 Village Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Rural China; Appendix 7A: Formal Description and Solution to the Village Election Game; Conclusion; Appendix Empirical Sources and Methods; Appendix A: Informants; Appendix B: Interview Questions; Appendix C: Sources of the Cases on Village Elections; References; Index.
"How does China maintain authoritarian rule while it is committed to market-oriented economic reforms? This book analyzes this puzzle by offering a systematic analysis of the central-local governmental relationship in rural China, focusing on rural taxation and political participation. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Chinese local officials and villagers, and combining them with game-theoretic analyses, it argues that the central government uses local governments as a target of blame for the problems that the central government has actually created. The most recent rural tax reforms, which began in 2000, were a conscious trade-off between fiscal crises and rural instability. For the central government, local fiscal crises and the lack of public goods in agricultural areas were less serious concerns than the heavy financial burdens imposed on farmers and the rural unrest that the predatory extractive behavior of local governments had generated in the 1990s, which threatened both economic reforms and authoritarian rule"--
9781316004616 (electronic bk.) 1316004619 (electronic bk.) 9781107297883 (electronic bk.) 1107297885 (electronic bk.) 9781316009116 1316009114
Fiscal policy--China.
Taxation--China.
Rural population--China.
Rural development--China.
Politique fiscale--Chine.
Impôt--Chine.
Population rurale--Chine.
Développement rural--Chine.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--Government--International.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS--Public Finance.
Fiscal policy.
Rural development.
Rural population.
Taxation.
China.
Electronic books.
HJ1401 / .T35 2014eb
336.2/01451
Tax reform in rural China : revenue, resistance, and authoritarian rule / Hiroki Takeuchi. - 1 online resource
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Cover; Half title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Tables; Figures; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Introduction; 1 The Theory of Revenue and Resistance under Authoritarian Rule in Rural China; Part I Historical and Analytical Contexts; 2 Revenue and Resistance in Rural China in History; 3 Revenue and Resistance under Authoritarian Rule in Post-Mao Rural China, 1980-2005; 4 Survival Strategies of Local Governments; Part II Analytic Narratives; 5 Exit Strategies of Villagers; Appendix 5A: Formal Description and Solution to the Game of Migration and Taxation. 6 Voice Strategies of VillagersAppendix 6A: Formal Description and Solution to the Migration, Participation, Taxation Game; 7 Village Elections and Authoritarian Rule in Rural China; Appendix 7A: Formal Description and Solution to the Village Election Game; Conclusion; Appendix Empirical Sources and Methods; Appendix A: Informants; Appendix B: Interview Questions; Appendix C: Sources of the Cases on Village Elections; References; Index.
"How does China maintain authoritarian rule while it is committed to market-oriented economic reforms? This book analyzes this puzzle by offering a systematic analysis of the central-local governmental relationship in rural China, focusing on rural taxation and political participation. Drawing on in-depth interviews with Chinese local officials and villagers, and combining them with game-theoretic analyses, it argues that the central government uses local governments as a target of blame for the problems that the central government has actually created. The most recent rural tax reforms, which began in 2000, were a conscious trade-off between fiscal crises and rural instability. For the central government, local fiscal crises and the lack of public goods in agricultural areas were less serious concerns than the heavy financial burdens imposed on farmers and the rural unrest that the predatory extractive behavior of local governments had generated in the 1990s, which threatened both economic reforms and authoritarian rule"--
9781316004616 (electronic bk.) 1316004619 (electronic bk.) 9781107297883 (electronic bk.) 1107297885 (electronic bk.) 9781316009116 1316009114
Fiscal policy--China.
Taxation--China.
Rural population--China.
Rural development--China.
Politique fiscale--Chine.
Impôt--Chine.
Population rurale--Chine.
Développement rural--Chine.
POLITICAL SCIENCE--Government--International.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS--Public Finance.
Fiscal policy.
Rural development.
Rural population.
Taxation.
China.
Electronic books.
HJ1401 / .T35 2014eb
336.2/01451